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By Tanya Kateri Hernandez
a1cial integrto has long been the
touchstone of racial progress in the
0 workplace. But integration is only the
beginning of the struggle to end racial dis-
crimination. As workplaces become more
diverse, they do nor necessarily becomie less
racially discriminatory. Diverse workplaces
may be characterized by antagonism
between people ofdifferent races. Interethnic
discrimination may exist along side the dis-
crimination that has traditionally occurred
between blacks and whites, i.e., non-white
racial and ethnic groups may engage in dis-
parate-treatment employment discrimina-
tion actionable under Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act.' Examples of interethnic
discrimination occur among members of
different ethnic subgroups, as when Puerto
Ricans allegedly discriminate against
Mexican-Americans or Dominicans, or
white Latinos allegedly discriminate against
Afro-Latinos. In reality, then, there are
many ways that non-white ethnic groups
and subgroups can be complicit in race-
based decision making in the workplace.
In the emerging interethnic discrimina-
tion cases, workplace diversity has been
viewed as something of a safe harbor from
charges of discrimination. This view exists
despite established Supreme Court prec-
edent to the contrary. Early in the history
of Title VII, the Supreme Court rejected
the premise that no question of bias could
be present if a workplace has many mem-
bers from a plaintiff's protected grouIp.2
Yet, when the context is contemporary
interethnic discrimination, the emerging
cases suggest that some courts are so viscer-
ally impressed by the vision of a presum-
ably diverse workplace that they miss the
applicability of this precedent and instead
construct what I term a makeshift "diver-
sity defense" to discrimination.
The diversity defense describes the
equivalent of racially harmonious ones.
This equivalence effectively treats all
people of color as the same and over-
looks the histories of racial animus with-
in and across different ethnic groups.
The judicial fashioning of a diversity
defense to employment discrimination
appears to reflect wishful thinking that
diversity is a panacea for racial conflict.'
Unfortunately, diversity alone cannot
eradicate racial discriminaition.
The majority of interethnic employo-
ment discrimination claims that are start-
ing to appear are those in which Latinos
are involved as victims or as agents of
individual disparate treatment discrimi-
nation in the workplace. Accordingly, it
is important to note that racisma, and in
particular anti-black racism, is a pervasive
and historically entrenched fact of life in
Latin America and the Caribbean. Over
90 percent of the approximately 10 nmil-
lion enslaved Africans brought to the
Americas were taken to Latin America
and the Caribbean, whereas only 4.6 per-
cent were brought to the United States.
In Latin America and the Caribbean,
as in the United States, lighter skin and
European features can increase one's
chances for socioeconomic advancement,
while darker skin and African or indig-
enous features may limit opportunities
for social mobility.4 Attitudes of bias are
also well established within the Latino
community. Sociological studies of Latino
racial attitudes often reflect a preference
on the part of Latinos for maintaining
social distance from African Americans.
And wvhile the social distance level is larg-
est for recent Latin-American immigrants,
more established communities of Latinos
in the United States are also character-
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ized by their social distance from African
Americans.'
Consider a paradigmatic case that
deimoistrates the analytical problems
surfacing in the emerging interethnic
discrimination cases. A self-identified
Afro-Panamanian tutor of Spanish sued
his university employer for failure to
renew his appointment as an adjunct
instructor, claimingy a violation of Title
VII's prohibition against race and nation-
al origin discrimination. The plaintiff
alleged that the Latinos who directed
the department where he worked dis-
criminated against "Black Hispanics,"
and that there was a disturbing culture
of favoritism in promoting white Cubans,
Spaniards, and white Hispanics from
South America. The court. not under-
standing that a color hierarchy informs
the ways in which many Latinos experi-
ence the racism and national origin bias
of othler Latinos, dismissed his racial
discrimination claim on summary judg-
menit.6 The national origin claim was also
dismiissed on summary judgment, because
five of the eight adjunct instructors that
were reappointed instead of the plaintiff
were natives of other South or Central
American countries such as Argentina,
Peru, Mexico, and the Dominican
Republic. The surviving discrimination
claim that went before the jury, which
was based on color, was weakened by the
absence of information as to how color
bias may be a manifestation of racism in
Latino cultures, and the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the defendant. The
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judge explicitly stated int the opinion that
"Diversity in an employer'sstaff undercuts
an inference of discrim 1tina to(ry intent."
This decision embodies a number of
serious legal and factual errors. To begin
with, the notion that dive rsity in the work-
place disproves bias ruins entirely counter
to a significant line of' Supreme Court
decisions explaining the pr-oper use, and
nonuse, of statistical iniformnation about
diversity. The rules of statistical inference
and its evidentiary use were incorporated
into the jurisprudence of employment dis-
crimination under Castaveda v. Partida.1
In its decision there, the Supreme Court
explained that statistically significant
measures showing a lack of workplace
diversity may constitute evidence of dis-
crimination.' But that doesn't work in
reverse: the presence of statistical diver-
sity in the workplace (mnore precisely, the
absence of statistical evidence of a lack
of diversity) cannot be equated with the
absence of discrimination itself. This is
so because, as the Supreme Court noted
in Teamsters v. United States,' population
statistics have been traditionally consid-
ered relevant to Title VII cases only in the
context of statistically significant, gross
underrepresentations of racial minorities,
since our racial history has shown that, in
the absence of any other explanation, it is
more likely than nor that racial discrimina-
tion accounts for the underrepresentation.
Indeed, workforce statistics were first
approved for use in individual disparate
treatment cases only insofar as they "may
be helpful to a determination of whether
petitioner's refusal to hire respondent
conformed to a general pattern of discrim-
ination." 10 There was no suggestion that
workforce statistics could have an excul-
patory use. Moreover, in Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp.," the Court rejected the
the equivalent of treating immiigrants from
Nigeria, Egypt, and South Africai as racially
homogYeneous. As in Africa, thec con-tinent
of Latin America contains va,,st differenc-
es in racial composition and biais. Those
countries perceived or touted as European
are v:iewed as more adIvanced than those
more significantly populated with people
of indigyenous or African descenr. Thus, in
the list of countries the judg(.e imentioned in
finding an absence of national origin bias,
Latin American racial constructs would
rank Argentina as a highly v'alued white
country. followed by Peru, then Mexico with
its indigyenous population. Leaist respected
would be the Dominican Republic and the
plaintiffs own country of origin, Panama,
because of their dominance by African-
descended peoples.
For Latinos influenced by Latin
American racial paradigms where each
country has a racial identification, a diverse
workforce of Latinos is not the immediate
equivalent of a bias-free context. Nor is
a color preference divorced from a racial-
izdielgy within the Latino context. 2
Diversity mecans something more nuanced
to people of color, who tend not to view
each ethnic group as the same as another
simply because it is non-white. Yet the
public discourse about diversity as a pana-
cea for racial discrimination overlooks the
complexity of actual diversity. In a diverse
workplace there is the possibility for racial
harmony, but there is also the possibility for
a racial dystopia. What the emerging cases
suggest is that, unlike with traditional black-
white employment discrimination cases,
interethnic discrimination cases require a
broader inquiry, one that will reveal how
bias is manifested in multiethnic conitexts.
Demogc)raphers project that one in
four job seekers will1 be the child of a
Latinio immiigrant by the year 2020 and
that- Tiowreswlvatyicae
34 e J Vol. 49 No. 434
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the workplace, presents major challenges
to the employment discrimination regime
under Title VII. One of these challenges
lies in the collection and presentation uf
information about the existence of bias
within Latino subgroups.
A fuller record of interethnic racial
animus is needed to add nuance to the
jurisprudence of antidiscrimination so
that the multiethnic workplace becomes
less opaque to
fact-finders and
legal actors can
identify the new
markers of racial
discrimination. 13
The Multiracial
Racism Litigation
Approach (MRLA)
proposed here is
one mechanism
for doing so. Given
the traditional
presumption that
racial discrimina-
tion only exists
when a white-
Anglo person is
present as an insti-
gator or victim, this
proposed approach
would require
plaintiffs to provide
r
more detailed pleadings in the vein of a
"Brandeis brief," i.e., one in which eco-
nomic and sociat surveys and studies are
included along with explications of the
law. Expert witnesses on the subject of
interethnic bias will need to be brought
in and depositions will need to be more
expansive in approach. By more fully
developing the record, fact-finders will
be better able to see beyond the veil of
a diverse workplace as a presumed racial
utopia. This approach will, thus, rein-
force for courts how established employ-
ment discrimination doctrines may b
applicable to the context of interethnic
discrimination.
One court has already anticipated the
need for a fuller record wvith social science
data and expert witnesses in interethnic
discrimination cases. In All v. NationaCI-
B3ank of Pakistan,'14 a self-des;cribed lighI-t.
skinned Pakistani citizen from the prov-
ince of Punjab employed at the National
Bank of Pakistan's New York branch
alleged that the bank discriminated
against him in favor of darker-skinned
Pakistani citizens from the province of
Sind. In dismissing the plaintiffs claim,
the court noted that, while a number of
light-skinned employees predominated in
the less highly paid job positions, it was
problematic that
no "evidence by
way of expert tes-
timonv or treatise
was presented with
c respect to color dif-
ferences among the
1 various provinces
of Pakistan, or dis-
crimination based
on color." The
court was disturbed
by the lack of a full-
er record because
it was unclear
whether a light-
skinned Pakistani
who "is darker in
complexion than
those commonly
termed white in
the United States"
warrants (pro-
itected class status" under the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie evidentiary standards.
The court explicitly stated:
Suffice it to note that the presump-
tion of a protected class status on the
basis of color is bound up with an
entire national racial history. It may
well be that there are indigenous
discriminatory practices around the
world having nothing to do with
the American experience. However,
there is no basis on this record for
the recognition of skin color as a
presumptive discriminatory criterion
(rooted one wvould suppose, in the
intermingling of dfistinctive iiational
or racial grouips) in employment in
Pak-istan, or amongc Pakistanis in
New York, under lMcDonnell Douglas
guidelines.
In short, the judge is asserting that
when Title VII cases implicate ra.,cial
meanings beyond what is commonly
expected in the U.S. setting, a fuller record
about those meanings must be established
in order for the existing legal doctrine to
be applied effectively. And that is exaictly
why the MRLA proposed herein shoutd
be more systematically applied.
The goal of the MRLA is to contextu-
alize allegations of interethnic discrimina-
tion by (1) establishing the premise that
interethnic hierarchy and bias may exist,
(2) focusing the inquiry on whether there
were racially advantaged and disadvantaged
employees among the diverse non-white
workers, (3) providing the social science
data about the relevant racial attitudes,
and (4) demonstrating the applicability
of established employment discrimination
doctrine to diverse workplaces.
judges customarily admit empirical
information through the use of expert
witnesses, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 702. judges have accepted the
presentation of expert testimony on the
deployment of racial stereotypes in the
workplace in order to disabuse fact-finders
of what they believe is "common sense."15
In Walker v. State, a law professor pro-
vided expert testimony on behalf of an
African-American state trooper alleging
discriminatory discharge.' 6 The testimo-
ny, based on research in the literature of
racial stereotyping, explained how the
content of the performance evaluations
was rooted in racial stereotyping. Expert
testimony in interethnic discrimination
cases would be especially useful in delin-
eating how various populations of color
racialize themselves by subgyrou)p and
other grouips as -well.
In cases where litigants do not proffer
the emnpirical evidence themselves, a grow-
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bar this third use of social science in law,
thereby allowing a court to admit empiri-
cal information "to kecep it responsive to its
changing environment."1 1
Fortunately, the admission of empirical
evidence to create a social framework is not
contravened by the trial court gatekeeper
role envisioned in Daubert v. Meirelt Dow
Pharamaceuticals 1 9
and its subsequent
cases. This is
because the prof-
fered empirical
evidence is sci -
entifically valid,
as indicated by
(1) its publication
in peer-reviewed
joumnals, (2) its
general acceptance
within the scholarly
disciplines of soci-
ology and politi-
cal science, and
(3) its relevance
to employment
discrimination
case issues of cul-
tural stereotyping.
Furthermore, the
MRLA requires
no modification of
existing legal standards for proving indi-
vidual disparate treatment discrimination.
This is because apparent workplace diver-
sity does not alter any of the preexisting
legal standards for proving discrimination
as articulated in McDonnell v. Douglas
and its progeny.20 As the Supreme Court
has stated, "a racially balanced work force
cannot immunize an employer from liabil-
ity for specific acts of discrimination." 21
The MRLA would simply provide needed
context for the standard Title VII proof
in diverse workplaces. Plaintiffs must still
show how the alleged facts amount to
discrimination but will do so by focus-
ing on cultural and historical context. 22
Defendants will still have the same
opportunity for rebuttal by proffering a
-nondiscriminatoty reason for the chal-
lenged employment decision, in addition
to providing expert witnesses of their own
regarding the relevant cultural and histori-
cal context presented by the plaintiff.
Retumning then to the paradigmatic
Latino interethnic discrimination case,
the plaintiff needed to explicitly present
the documentation of how racial privilege
and bias generally exist in non-white
contexts. With that background empiri-
cal information, the plainitiff would then
h ave been more
likely to persuade
the court to con-
sider the empirical
data about Latino
racial attitudes
and their manifes-
tation. The plain-
tiffs submission of
expert testimony
regarding the long
legacy of anti-
black bias against
A f ro - La t ino s
within Latin
America would
have dispelled
the inclination
to view Latinos
as homogeneous
and interchange-
able. In turn, the
disruption of the
presumption of
would have elimi-Latino homogeneity
nated the rationalization that "diversity in
an employer's staff undercuts an inference
of discriminatory intent." And established
employment discrimination doctrine
would not have been overlooked.
In conclusion, because of the long
legacy of black-white racism in the United
States, discussion of race has rightfully
focused on the black-white paradigm of
U.S. race relations and its effects on civil
rights enforcement. Bu-t the changing
demographics of the United States means
that we need to expand the analysis of
racism to include considerations of how
groups of color can be complicit and
even active agents in the discrimination
against other groups of color. By supply-
ing judges with the empirical information
they need to better apprehend that racial
bias can exist even within multiracial
workplace settings, we can acti-vely Work
to appropriately enforce our nation's civil
rights laws within diverse workplaces.
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